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The industrial diversification of cities is explained without imposing linkages among 
industries. In each of two city-industries, a manufacture is produced competitively as the 
final good using labor and industry-specific differentiated services. Manufacturers import 
the services of their industry from all cities that produce them, since their technology 
favors variety. In specialized cities, the city-industry is large and many services are 
locally available but the two manufactures have to be traded among cities. In diversified 
cities the two manufactures are produced in the same city, and each industry crowds out 
half the local services of the other, but manufactures need not be imported. A lower cost 
of trading manufactures (e.g. railroads and intercity highways) favors a system of 
specialized cities, while a lower cost of trading services (e.g. telephone, the Internet) 
favors a system of diversified cities since the latter cities rely more on imported services, 
having fewer locally. A larger cost-share of services favors specialization, and high 
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1.   Introduction 
  A central issue in urban economic theory is how cities become diversified or 
specialized in industry mix. There are models of a system of specialized cities by 
Henderson [9], Helsley and Strange [11], Henderson and Abdel-Rahman [10]. In these 
models, there are increasing returns within individual industries in a city (localization 
economies) but no economies of scope across industries (urbanization economies). In 
Abdel-Rahman [2] and Abdel-Rahman and Fujita [3], diversification is explained by 
economies of scope among industries. But all these models share a common limitation: 
trade among cities is not modeled. In Abdel-Rahman [4], intercity trade of final goods is 
modeled, but the intermediate goods are not tradable between cities. On the other hand, 
trade and transportation cost are important components in the New Economic Geography 
(Krugman [17], Fujita, Krugman and Venables [15]), but there are no intermediate goods 
(services), only final goods. As a result, the NEG does not explain how railroads or the 
inter-state highway system (which reduced the transport cost of manufactures) and the 
Internet (which revolutionized how information in the service sector is now distributed) 
can have different impacts on city structure. The NEG also ignores urban land markets.   
          We  will  explain  specialization  or  diversification  by  focusing  on  the  intercity 
transport costs for manufactures and services, and without imposing a technological 
economy of scope between industries. We follow the monopolistic competition and 
  1 product differentiation paradigm in modeling urban agglomeration (Dixit and Stiglitz [7], 
Ethier [8], Abdel-Rahman [1],  Fujita [12], Rivera-Batiz [18]), but we extend this line of 
models  in two ways.   
          First, differentiated intermediate goods (services) are specific to a manufacturing 
industry, but are tradable among different cities at some transport cost. In the literature, 
all models using the presence of a technological bias for the variety of intermediate 
inputs to explain urban agglomeration assume that these goods are not tradable among 
cities  
(Abdel-Rahman [1], Rivera-Batiz [18]). This ignores the fact that intercity trade of 
intermediate goods introduces pecuniary links among cities, creating positive intercity 
production externalities.
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            Second, we assume that the intercity movement of final goods (manufactures) and 
intermediate goods (services) incur different transport costs. While the intercity transport 
of manufactures requires physical movement, the intercity transport of many services can 
take place through telecommunication or direct face-to-face contact. The communication 
revolution including the Internet improved intercity information flows. Since services are 
information intensive, their transport cost is lowered relative to that of manufactures.  
  In our model, an industry consists of a manufactured good and of specialized 
services used as inputs to produce it. Two types of manufactures are produced, and each 
city can specialize in producing one of them or diversify and produce both. The two 
manufactures use mutually exclusive (industry-specific) sets of services  and have no 
direct technological relationship with one another. Following Dixit and Stiglitz [7] and 
  2 Ethier [8], we treat manufacturing as competitive and constant returns with labor and 
industry-specific differentiated services as inputs. Services are produced under increasing 
returns to scale and are monopolistically competitive.  
  We use the model to analyze only two symmetric equilibria under the same 
parameters. In one of these, each city is specialized in one manufacture, importing the 
other from other cities. Industry-specific services are used from the same city as well as 
imported from all other cities producing the same manufacture. In the other equilibrium, 
the cities are diversified and each city produces both manufactures. In this case each city 
is self sufficient in consumption and manufactures are not imported. However, industry-
specific services are still imported from all other cities. We make the two industries 
symmetric so that the number of cities and specialized versus diversified city populations 
are the same in each type of equilibrium. We derive the following results. 
First, different transportation shocks have different effects on specialization 
versus diversification. When the transport cost of manufactures decreases, diversified 
cities do not benefit because they do not incur any intercity transport cost for 
manufactures in the first place. However, specialized cities gain by spending less on 
importing the manufacture they do not produce. Hence, such a shock favors the 
specialization of cities. When the intercity transport cost of services decreases, 
diversified cities benefit more. The reason is that the co-location of the two 
manufacturing industries in the same city causes the crowding out of the services of the 
two industries because of limits on city size while the total system wide services does not 
change. More precisely, each manufacturing industry is half as big and has only half as 
  3 many services available locally if it locates in a city with the other industry than if it 
locates in a city by itself. Therefore each manufacturer in a diversified city is more reliant 
on services imported from other cities. Therefore, a lowering of the cost of transporting 
services favors the diversification of cities. Accordingly, the telecommunication 
revolution and the Internet favor diversification of cities.   
Second, the national population growth affects whether cities are specialized or 
diversified. When population is larger, there are more cities. In this situation, a 
diversified city can import a larger variety of services and the crowding out effects 
between industries become less significant. Therefore, diversified cities are favored in 
larger economies. More generally, our model predicts that when there are pecuniary 
spillovers  among cities, cities might switch patterns on their growth paths even when 
there are no technological shocks. 
 Third, each equilibrium may not be optimal. Using numerical methods, we show 
that, under the same parameter values, the equilibrium configuration can be a system of 
specialized cities while the optimal configuration can be one of diversified cities. The 
fundamental reason that equilibrium is not necessarily optimal is the pecuniary 
externality arising from the intercity trade of the differentiated services that causes the 
number of cities in the market solution to be too few relative to the optimum.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model of a 
representative city in a system of cities with only one industry. Sections 3 and 4 introduce 
two industries and derive the equilibria for a system of diversified and specialized cities 
  4 respectively. Section 5 compares the utilities achieved in the two configurations and 
Section 6 discusses  some extensions.  
2.  A one-industry city system  
        We present a simple model of a one-industry city system. The case of two 
industries will be analyzed in the subsequent sections by drawing on this model.  
  Consider an economy with a system of n cities where the exogenously given 
national population is free to locate in any city. Each city produces the same manufacture 
tradable in the international market and a set of differentiated services tradable 
domestically among cities. Production of the manufacture is constant returns and uses 
labor and all service varieties as inputs. City residents have identical Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions and consume the domestic manufacture and a good imported from the 
international market. Service production uses only labor and exhibits increasing returns  
internal to the firm. Production and trading in a city occur in the CBD (the center of the 
city) and land is not an input in production. Each city resident, on the other hand, 
consumes a fixed unit of land and is endowed with one unit of time. We assume that 
cities are set in a hypothetical space where any two cities are equidistant. This last 
assumption simplifies the analysis by imposing an abstract spatial symmetry.  




































,  0 < u < 1 and σ > 1,         (2.1) 
  5 where,  X is the output of a representative manufacturer, Hx is labor,  is the quantity of 
the  jth service purchased from the ith city, n is the number of cities in the system and  m
ij d z
i 
is the number of  services produced in city i.  (2.1) exhibits an extreme technological bias 
for variety in the use of services. Because the marginal product of a service is infinite 
when it is not employed, the manufacturer will use all of the services available in the city 
system no matter what the price. 
  Assume that in equilibrium, all services are symmetric and all cities identical. Let  
m be the number of services produced in each city,  city i’s demand for a service 
produced in city i and   city i’s demand for a service produced in another city. Then  































.      (2.2) 
The intercity transport cost of a service takes the iceberg form: only a fraction τ 
(0 < τ < 1) of the good arrives while the rest “melts” during transport. Let q be the price 
of a service produced and used in city i. Due to iceberg transport, the effective price of 




3   
Let the competitive wage in the city be w and the world price of the manufacture 
be Px. The profit maximization problem of a manufacturer is 
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subject to  , where X is given by  (2.2). The first order conditions are:  0 , , ≥
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.                         (2.6)    
  Following Dixit and Stiglitz [7], we assume that the market structure of services 
is monopolistically competitive with labor the only input in production. The labor 
requirements for service producers are identical and technology is increasing returns: 
  ,        (2.7)  s z cz f H + =
where  Hz  is the total labor requirement of a service producer, f is the fixed labor   
requirement, c is the marginal labor requirement and zs is the service output. Marginal 
cost must equal marginal revenue, and firms must make zero profit in a long run 
Chamberlin equilibrium with differentiated products. Let E be the price elasticity of 
manufacturers’ demand for a service. With E = σ, 
4 we can solve the price of a service 







σ .          (2.8) 





) 1 ( −
=
σ
.                         (2.9) 
Substituting zs into equation (2.7), we get the total labor demand of a service producer: 
  .             (2.10)  σ f H z =
  7    In equilibrium, the number of services, m, in each city and the demand for 
services by manufacturers,  and  , are such that the service markets clear and full 
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   c H = ,         (2.12)  z x mH H +
where Hc is the city’s supply of labor and is assumed given for now. 
  In equations (2.4)-(2.6) and (2.8)-(2.12), we have eight equations in the eight 
variables: w, q, zs,  ,  , H
i d z
i d z
− z, Hx and m. The number of services in a city, the city’s 
manufacturing output and the wage implied by these equations are: 
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  Now let us consider the consumption side.  Two goods are consumed in the 
economy: the domestic manufacture, x, and the imported one, y. The consumer chooses 
quantities of x and y to maximize utility. The utility function is: 
  , 1 > α , β > 0 and α+β=1,       (2.16) 
β α β αβ α y x U ) (
− − =
  8 Then, given the world prices Px, Py, and the disposable income of a city resident, I(N), 
contingent on city population, N, the indirect utility function is: 
 ) .        (2.17)    ( ) ( N I P P N U y x
β α − − =
  Assume public land ownership. A city’s aggregate differential rents are 
redistributed equally among that city’s residents. Assume that the base land rent is zero 
and that each city resident consumes one unit of land (land demand is perfectly inelastic). 
With this fixed-lot-size assumption, if city population is N and the city is circular, the 





1 − = π N rf .          (2.18) 
Assume that intracity commuting time is a linear function of the distance between a 
residence and the CBD. Let the time endowment for a city resident be 1. So if a city 
resident lives at distance r from the CBD, his labor supply after commuting is: 
  ,           (2.19)  tr r H − =1 ) (
where t is the intracity time-cost of commuting per unit distance. From equations (2.18) 
and (2.19), the total labor supply of the city is now found as 
  ) 1 ( ) ( 2
2
1
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In equilibrium, residents achieve the same income regardless of location. Hence: 
 ) ,  0 .     (2.21)  ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( f f r R w tr r R w tr − − = − − f r r ≤ ≤
  9 The right side of (2.21) is the net income  (after transport and rent) for a resident at the 
fringe of the city and the left side is the net income for a resident at distance r from the 
CBD. At the city fringe, R(rf) = 0. This gives: 
  .         (2.22)  w r r t r R f ) ( ) ( − =
Integrating this gives the total differential rent (TDR): 
  ∫ = =
f r w kN





π .         (2.23) 
The disposable income for a city resident is his wage income plus his share of 
redistributed differential rent, less the rent he pays for his lot: 
  w kN r R
N
TDR
w tr N I ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
2
1
− = − + − = .    (2.24)   
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Substituting w from (2.25) into (2.24), we get: 
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and substituting this into (2.17), we get the city’s utility level: 
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  From (2.27), it is easy to see that U(N) first increases with N  and then decreases 
with  N. When  increases (i.e. the transportation cost of services decreases), U(N) 
increases. Also, U(N) increases with the number of cities, n, because adding a city 
confers a positive externality on all other cities by increasing the diversity of services.  
τ
  10   The equilibrium city size is achieved where the utility level of a city resident is 





 using (2.27), and assuming large 
total population.
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 Substituting (2.28) and (2.29) into (2.27) we could get the equilibrium utility 
level.
6 Now consider the socially optimal city size. As already noted, there are intercity 
externalities due to the trading of services, not taken into account by market agents. But 
suppose that a planner at the national level decides the number (and size) of cities 
assuming that all cities are identical. Then, the intercity externalities will be internalized. 
When the planner maximizes the utility level of city residents, he does not take n, as 
given but determines it as 
N
N
n = . So the planner considers that if there are more cities, 
each will be smaller. To get the optimal city size, we substitute 
N
N
n =  into (2.27) and 
maximize U(N) with respect to N. In Xiong [19] it is shown that cities should be smaller 
in the optimum than they are in the equilibrium. Hence, there should be more cities in the 
  11 optimum. The intuition is straightforward: positive externalities stem from the number of 
services. At the individual city level, when a service firm enters the city, it does not take 
into account that it imposes a positive externality on the manufacturers in that and in 
other cities. Hence, there are too few services because each firm considers the private 
marginal product not the social marginal product of its entry. As shown in Xiong [19], a 
sales subsidy on service output imposed by the planner corrects this externality and 
achieves the optimum. Developers who set up a new city fail to consider the positive 
external effect on manufacturers in other cities from the new services of their new city. 
Hence, the equilibrium does not have enough cities.  
3.       Equilibrium in a system of diversified cities 
          Now we introduce two industries into the city system. We assume that the 
imported manufactured good y of section 2 is no longer imported from abroad but is now 
also produced in the city system and that this second industry also consists of constant 
returns manufacturers and of differentiated services used by their industry only. In this 
diversified city system, all cities produce both manufactures and their respective services. 
Cities are identical and self sufficient in manufactures. Hence, manufactures are not 
traded but the differentiated services are traded within the same industry among different 
cities.
7 The equilibrium configuration of the diversified city system is determined in three 
steps. First, within each industry, we determine the output and wage when industry 
employment is given. Second, within each city, we determine the equilibrium city wage 
and the split of the total labor supply between the two industries given the city’s 
  12 population. Lastly, we determine the equilibrium city population, the number of cities 
and the city system’s equilibrium utility level when the total population is given.  
The production configuration within each industry is identical to that of the basic 
model described in section 2. Let the population of a representative diversified city be N. 
From (2.20), we can get the total labor supply of the city: 
  ) 1 (
2
1
kN N Hc − = .         (3.1) 
Now suppose that Ni of the city’s population works in industry i, then the labor supply to 
industry i is: 
8  
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The total output and the wage of each industry can be derived as we did in section 2. For 



















i u i u i u


















σ σ σ δ λ
i u i u i u
kN N P w i i i i .                      (3.4) 
































In equilibrium, the wage rates in the two industries are the same: 
  .                                    (3.5)  w w w = = 2 1
From  (2.24), the income of a city resident as a function of the wage is: 
  w kN N I ) 1 ( ) (
2
1
− = .                           (3.6) 
  13   Once the income is determined, we can get the Marshallian demands for the two 
manufactured goods: each city resident spends a portion   of his income on one good  
and a portion   on the other.  Since all cities are identical in equilibrium, both 
manufacture markets clear locally in each city (no trade) and the sum of workers in the 
two industries equals the city’s population.
α
β
9 This gives: 
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 Setting  P2 = 1, from equations (3.3)-(3.9) we can solve for N1, N2, P1, P2, X1, X2, 
w1, w2 and I(N). The solutions for N1, N2 and P1 are: 
  ,          (3.10)  N N α = 1
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Substituting P1 (P2=1) and w1 into the indirect utility  1
2
1
2 1 ) 1 ( ) ( w kN P P N − =
− − β α U , we 
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From (3.13), differentiating U  with respect to N, we get equilibrium city size  :  ) (N d
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n = .          (3.15) 
Substituting   from (3.14) and   from (3.15) into (3.13), we get the equilibrium 
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4.      Equilibrium in a system of specialized cities 
  There are two trade patterns in this configuration. First, cities of different types 
trade manufactures with each other exporting one manufacture and importing the other. 
Second, cities of the same type trade the services of their shared service industry. We first 
solve the equilibrium for each type of city when the population of that type of city is 
given and then analyze the equilibrium size and the equilibrium number of cities of each 
type when the city-system population is given.  
  The internal structure of a representative city producing only one manufacture 
was fully specified in section 2. Suppose that there are n1 type-one cities each with 
population N1 and n2 type-two cities each with population N2.  Since the two types of 
cities don’t have any direct production relationship, we can use the results of section 2 to 
  15 get the total output, the equilibrium wage, and the utility level of an individual city of 



















i u i u i u


















σ σ σ δ λ
i u i u i u










] 1 [ ) ( ) ( 1 1 1
2 1


























] 1 [ ) ( ) ( 2 2 2
1 1

















P N U                  (4.4) 
Where   and   is the portion of the final good which arrives at the 
importing city. Let   be the income of a resident in a type i city. From (2.24) we 
know that: 
1 ) 1 ( 1
− − + ≡
σ τ δ i i n
) ( i i N I
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  i i i i w kN N I ) 1 ( ) (
2
1
− = ,         (4.5) 
  For the two types of specialized cities to coexist, utility must be equal across 
cities, and the national labor market must clear, while the population constraint is 
satisfied. So we have the equilibrium conditions: 
 ) ,         (4.6)    ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 N U N U =
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  16   We can solve w1, w2, I1, I2, X1, X2, U1, U2, P1, P2, n1, n2 from the twelve equations 
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, taking the numbers of each type of city, n1 and n2 as given. From these 







































. Substituting (4.14) into (4.11) and (4.12), we get the equilibrium 
number of cities: 
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Now let us briefly compare the equilibrium utility levels of the diversified and 















, which is less than 1. At the same time, equation (4.17) has a leading 
term θ
2αβ, which is also less than one (since θ <1). In the next section, we will show that 
these terms capture the benefits of diversification and specialization respectively and that 
they play a critical role in determining the relative utilities of the two configurations. 
5.  Efficiency of diversified and specialized city systems 
  In the above sections we derived the equilibria for a system of specialized and a 
system of diversified cities when cities are symmetric with one another. We will now 
compare the two equilibra and see how the exogenous parameters determine which is 
more efficient.
10  
We will consider two situations. First, we will examine efficiency under the 
assumption that the agents who set up a city (e.g., a developer such as the one of the 
  18 Appendix) do not take into account how the presence of that city affects other cities. 
Next, we will reexamine efficiency under the assumption that the central planner 
determines the number of cities and, hence, also the size of each city.  
To simplify the analysis, we will assume that   and   
making the two industries symmetric.
uu 12 == u αβ == 05 .,
11 Substituting these into (3.14) and (4.14), we get 
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. Substituting   and   into (3.15), (4.15) and 
(4.16), we get: 
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that the number of cities and the city size (hereafter  and  ) are the same whether the 
city system is diversified or specialized.  
* n
* N
Proposition 1:(Diversification crowds out services).  Assume  and 
.  Let  be the industry-specific services produced in a city that is 
specialized in either manufacture. Let  =  =   be the industry-specific services 
in a diversified city producing both manufactures. Then,    :  diversification 
reduces by half the number of services locally available to each industry. Meanwhile, the 
city-system-wide services in any one industry is unaffected by diversification or 
specialization and is 
u u u = = 2 1
5 . 0 = = β α s m
1 d m 2 d m d m







  19 Proof: Recall that under the symmetry assumed, we have already shown that specialized 
and diversified cities are of the same total population, N (see (5.1)). Since the city labor 
supply is  ) 1 ( 2
1
kN N Hc − =
z d xd H m 2 +
σ f H z =
, it follows that the total labor supply is the same in each type 
of city. In a specialized city, the labor market clears by   where   is 
the labor employed in manufacturing. In a diversified city, the labor market clears by 
 where   is the labor demand by each of the two manufacturing 
industries and  is the labor demanded by each service producer. 
z s xs c H m H H + = xs H











where  and   are given by (4.1) and (4.2) respectively. Using these,  and, 
hence, 
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1 ( N . To see that the total number of services is unaffected by the 
type of equilibrium (diversified or specialized cities) define the total industry specific 
services in the two cases as  and  . Note that  and  . But we 
have shown that n and that  Hence,  =  =
d M
d m =
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s M d M
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        We will hereafter refer to this result as the “crowding out effect”. It is crucial in the 
next results we will derive because it shows that manufacturers located in diversified 
cities have fewer services locally and are more reliant on services produced in other cities 
and thus, more sensitive to changes in the intra-city cost of trading services, than are 
manufacturers located in specialized cities.  







* = . Substitute   and   into U given by  
(3.16) and U  given by (4.17). Using (5.1) and (5.2), Q
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k N f as given by (5.2). Note that in the 
denominator of (5.3), n
* is divided by two because in the system of specialized cities, 
each city imports services only from cities of the same type. 
  Q
* in equation (5.3) is the ratio of the utility of the diversified to the specialized 
city system with n
* cities in each case. When Q
* > 1 (< 1), a system of diversified 
(specialized) cities is the higher utility equilibrium. If Q
*=1, then the two configurations 
have equal utility.  
Proposition  2 :  Under symmetry  (u and  ) either 
specialization or diversification can be the higher utility equilibrium. The following 
conditions cause a diversified system of cities to attain a higher utility than a system of 
specialized cities: 
u u = = 2 1 5 . 0 = = β α
 
(a) Sufficiently low cost share of services (1-u); 
(b) Sufficiently high intercity transport cost for manufactures (1/θ); 
(c) Sufficiently high intracity commuting cost (k); 
(d) Sufficiently low intercity transport cost for services (1/τ); 
(e) Sufficiently high national population (N) ;  
(f)  Sufficiently high elasticity of substitution among services ( ).  σ
 
Proof:  For diversification to be the higher utility equilibrium, Q
* must be larger than 1. 
Note that the numerator of (5.3) is not affected by  . A sufficiently small θ guarantees  θ
  21 that Q
* > 1, whereas a θ  close to 1 guarantees Q
* <1. To see that specialization can 
generate higher utility, let θ be large and τ be small. In this case, the denominator of (5.3) 
is larger and the numerator of (5.3) becomes relatively smaller and we can easily have Q
* 
< 1 (for example, when θ =1 and  , Q τ <1
* is always smaller than one). Claims (a)-(e) of 































. To see claim (f), we examine the two extremes. Note that 
as   the service varieties become perfect substitutes and in fact   from 
(5.1). Since, in a world of perfect substitutes, the smallest city possible should be at least 
large enough to produce one service variety and some manufactures using only that 
variety, it follows that the number of cities also remains finite. Meanwhile,  →0 in 
(5.3) while the exponent 
∞ → σ 0
* → N















→ >1 and diversified 
cities achieve higher utility. At the other extreme, as   from above, varieties are 





N → : a very 







, the leading 
parenthesis goes to zero (because it is a fraction) and, hence, Q
*→ 0. Hence, specialized 
cities achieve higher utility. g 
To grasp the intuition behind the results of this Proposition, let’s look at the 
fundamental drivers that determine the city utility levels under the different 
  22 configurations.  First, the positive externalities within industries stem from the 
technological need for the variety of industry-specific services, and these externalities are 
higher when the cost share of services (1-u) is higher in the city or when service varieties 
are viewed as highly unique ( close to 1). Second, there are no positive externalities 
between the two industries.  Since the equilibrium city size is the same whether the city 
has one industry or two industries (see (5.1)), the positive externalities within each 
industry when the two industries coexist in a city are smaller than when only one industry 
exists in the city because a larger variety of industry-specific services is produced in the 
latter case (“crowding out effect” of Proposition 1). Third, the industry-specific services 
are tradable among different cities. Therefore, an industry in one city can benefit from the 
varieties of services in other cities the source of intercity externalities. However, these 
externalities are mediated by the intercity transport cost of these industry-specific 
services. At one extreme, if the intercity transport cost of services is infinite, these 
externalities disappear at the other extreme if transport costs are zero, the externalities are 
at their strongest. Fourth, the city system is closed. Therefore, if a city produces just one 
manufacture it must import the other from the rest of the city system. If the intercity 
transport cost of manufactures is high, then it is highly inefficient to import the 
manufacture from other cities. These four features drive the claims of Proposition2, and 
we are now ready to discuss the intuition.  
σ
First, let’s see why specialization gives higher utility when externalities within 
industries are high (claim(a)). In our model, when services have a larger share in final 
goods production relative to labor (high 1- u) the production externalities within 
  23 industries are higher. This favors a specialized city system with larger city-industries and, 
hence, a higher variety of services. A diversified city would realize fewer of these 















 in (3.16) decreases when u1 and u2 are smaller).  
That a lower intercity transport cost of manufactures increases the efficiency of a 







, where   is the portion of 
manufactures which arrive at the destination. When   increases, a diversified city system 
doesn’t benefit because it does not incur any intercity transportation costs for 
manufactures in the first place. However, a specialized city system gains because 
transportation cost is saved when manufactures are imported from cities of the other type 
(in (4.17), the leading term θ
θ
2αβ increases with θ).  






> 0, we 
conclude that a lower intracity commuting cost increases the efficiency of a specialized 
system relative to a diversified one (claim(c)). Note that when k decreases, the 
equilibrium city size grows and there are fewer cities. In this situation, specialized cities 
gain a lot of efficiency because more services are available in the city. However, for 
diversified cities, the efficiency gain from becoming larger is partially offset by the 
crowding out effect, therefore the utility gain is relatively smaller.   
  24 In claim (d) measures the intercity transport cost for services and a large   






> 0, we conclude that a shock that 
increases favors diversification. From Proposition 1, in diversified cities, a city-industry 
is half as big as it would be in a specialized city and relies more heavily on the services 
produced in other cities. Therefore, when the intercity transport cost of services 
decreases, diversified cities benefit more from spending less on importing services than 
do specialized cities. Thus, when cities are diversified, the crowding out effects become 
less important since now the services produced in other cities are cheaper to import.  
τ
When the national population becomes larger, there are more cities. The share of 
local services in any one city becomes a smaller fraction of the total services in the city 
system. But since diversified cities produce half as many services as specialized cities, a 
diversified city imports a higher share of its services from other cities and relies less on 
services produced locally than does a specialized city. Hence, population growth 
weakens the crowding out effect.  As a result, a system of diversified cities gains more 
than a system of specialized cities (claim(e)). 
And the last claim (f) is explained as follows. When the services are perfect 
substitutes ( ) variety has no value and all manufacturers use only one local 
service since imported services are more expensive.  In this situation, since variety has no 
value all positive externalities vanish and cities are diversified because there is no need to 
incur costs of trading manufactures. On the other hand, when the service variety is 
extremely important, manufacturers want maximum variety and this is accomplished in 
∞ → σ
  25 large specialized cities that have a large number of services. In this case manufactures are 
traded between cities but the cost of doing so is well worth it. 
Historically, the development of the railroad system and the interstate highway 
system significantly reduced intercity transportation cost for manufactures. And the 
invention of the automobile and the development of public transportation systems 
lowered intracity commuting cost. According to Proposition 2, these technological 
advances favored a specialized city system, ceteris paribus, allowing cities to realize 
larger scale economies, growing and becoming specialized. There is not much literature 
on how the more recent telecommunication revolution is affecting the efficiency of 
diversification. A telecommunication advance makes one city benefit more from other 
cities and thus increases positive intercity externalities. Proposition 2 indicates that such 
an advance favors the efficiency of a diversified city system since, because of the 
crowding out effect, a diversified city relies more heavily on imported services and 
services are information intensive.  
In the literature (e.g. Henderson [9], Abdel-Rahman and Fujita [3]), the effect of 
population growth on the specialization or diversification of cities is not examined. We 
showed that population growth favors diversification, an important finding since world 
population is growing.  
Proposition 2 is testable. We can construct different time paths of urban 
development by positing different sequences of exogenous shocks. An interesting and 
realistic path might be a diversification-specialization-diversification path. In stage one 
of such a path, a system of small diversified cities is the equilibrium. This stage lasts for 
  26 a long time with the industries exhibiting low scale economies, high intracity commuting 
cost and high intercity transportation cost for manufactures. At the next stage, there are 
shocks that increase intraindustry externalities (industrial revolution), reduce the intercity 
transportation cost for manufactures (e.g. the development of railways, trucking and 
highways) and intracity commuting cost (e.g. invention of automobiles). With these 
shocks, the city system should switch from many small and diversified cities to larger and 
specialized ones.  In the last stage, the national urban population size becomes very large 
and there are shocks that greatly reduce the intercity transportation cost of services (e.g. 
telecommunication improvements such as Internet, e-mail and eventually 
teleconferencing). In this stage, the city system should become diversified again.  
Recall that, in the analysis so far, market agents (or city developers) ignored the 
fact that if their city got larger the number of cities would also change. A central planner 
on the other hand, could directly take into account the interdependence of city sizes. For 
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. For a specialized city system, the planner would 
substitute (4.11) and (4.12) into   and   in (4.13) and maximize UN  with  2 δ N s (, 12 )
  27 respect to N1 and N2. Optimal city sizes (again interior solutions) for both types of cities 
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Define the utility of the diversified city system relative to the utility of the specialized 
city system under planning as Q*
12 =
. Substituting city size from (6.1) into (3.16) and from 
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Using numerical examples, we can show that the value of Q  can either be larger or 
smaller than one. Most importantly, our simulation results show that 
*
Q  for all 
exogenous variables, where  is defined by (5.3). Therefore, we could have 
Q * > *
Q* Q* >1 and 
. This is expressed by the following proposition.  Q* <1
Proposition 3: It is possible that the market equilibrium is a system of specialized 
cities while an equilibrium system of diversified cities would yield higher utility.    
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. In our model, intercity trade of 
services generates positive externalities, which are not taken into consideration by the 
market agents. The higher these intercity externalities, the farther the equilibrium is from 
  28 the optimum. In a diversified city system, there is more intercity trade of services since 
city-industries are half as big by Proposition 1. Hence, a diversified city relies more on 
the services imported from other cities. As a result, the diversified city system is more 
distorted in equilibrium than is the specialized system. So, it is possible that in 
equilibrium the utility level in a diversified system is smaller than that in the specialized 
system, but after all the market inefficiencies are corrected,
13 the diversified system 
achieves a higher utility level. In the literature, the departure of the equilibrium from the 
optimum in the context of specialization versus diversification is not analyzed.
14  
6.  Some Extensions 
We have analyzed the relative efficiency of city systems with specialized or 
diversified cities when both manufactures and services are tradable among different 
cities. Throughout the analysis, however, we concentrated on the case when cities and the 
two industries are symmetric. One direct extension of our model is to consider the 
existence of a mixed equilibrium in which some cities are diversified and some are 
specialized. It would be interesting to see whether such a mixed city system is a stable 
equilibrium when total population is large and whether it yields higher utility than the 
equilibria examined here.  
Another interesting extension of this paper is that we can consider cities 
producing only manufactures or only services. In Anas and Xiong [6], this approach is 
used to analyze the emergence of new cities with one industry composed of a 
manufacture and its related services. With two industries, can we have a hierarchical city 
system with a few big diversified cities producing both manufactures and their related 
  29 services, few more specialized and smaller cities producing only one manufacture and its 
related services, and many smaller cities producing only manufactures or only services? 
These are some of the interesting questions our modeling approach has the potential to 
answer.  
Finally, an important area of inquiry centers on how the diversification versus 
specialization of city systems influences growth and development and how growth, in 
turn, induces specialization or diversification. There has been some empirical work on 
this topic (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Schleifer [16]) but it is based on no formal theory of 
how or why diversification occurs. Our model has the potential to inform the 
specification of empirical models.    
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Footnotes 
1 This paper is based on chapters 2 and 3 of Kai Xiong’s Ph.D. Dissertation. We thank 
Vernon Henderson, two reviewers and the editor for useful comments.    
2 Consider the  growth in the intercity trading of financial services of all kinds in recent  
 
years, especially via the Internet. 
 
3 Here we assume that monopolistically competitive service producers use the mill-
pricing strategy. Buyers of the services (i.e., manufacturers) bear all the transport cost.  
4 See Dixit and Stigliz [7] or Fujita [13] for the proof. 
5 There are various market mechanisms to support this equilibrium notion. The new 
economic geography (Krugman [18]) stresses atomistic defection of firms, while the 
public finance literature assumes utility-taking competitive city developers (Henderson   33 
 
 
[9]). Xiong [19] assumes profit maximizing developers who operate in a contestable 
development market. See Appendix to see how this mechanism supports the equilibrium. 
6 Xiong [19] provides a detailed discussion of the properties of this equilibrium and does 
a comparative statics analysis.  
7 We only analyze the case when all the diversified cities are symmetric. Because of this 
symmetry, each city is self-sufficient in its manufactures and there is no intercity trade of 
manufactures.  
8 The residential choice of a city resident is independent of the industry he works in 
because residents have identical tastes and earn the same wage in equilibrium. So each 
industry’s share of labor supply is equal to the share of workers in that industry. 
9 The service markets are already cleared in the manner implied in section 2. 
10 We intentionally avoided modeling the complex asymmetric configurations in which 
diversified and specialized cities can coexist. It can be gleaned from prior work (e.g. 
Anas [5]) that when total population is sufficiently large, symmetric equilibria dominate 
asymmetric ones and that symmetric equilibria are stable while asymmetric ones are 
unstable. In Anas and Xiong [6], we show that this basic insight survives in more 
complex models similar to the one developed here: although the transition path can 
involve prolonged periods in which an asymmetric configuration exists, in the long run  
when total population is sufficiently large, a symmetric equilibrium yields higher 
welfare. Armed with this perspective, it is reasonable to conjecture, that a system of cities   34 
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that is disturbed by shocks will - in the long run - tend to settle on a symmetric 
equilibrium.  
 
11 In Xiong [19], the case of two asymmetric industries is also analyzed. It is shown 
quantitatively that the qualitative conclusions of the symmetric case all survive the 
asymmetry. 
12  For interior solutions, assume that the expressions under the square root signs in (6.1) 
and (6.2) are positive. 
  
13 See Xiong [19] for the first-best policy that makes the equilibrium optimal.  
14 Anas [5] analyzes a simple one-industry city system and shows that optimum and 
equilibrium do not generally coincide with respect to the number of cities and that the 
optimum city-system configuration is not always stable. When more than one industry 
exists, our model shows that the number of cities may or may not be optimal and that the 
optimal structure of industries within a city can also depart from the equilibrium.  
Appendix:  Equilibrium City Size 
  Suppose that cities are formed not by atomistic action of firms and workers but by 
city developers operating in a contestable market. A developer is an entrepreneur who 
sets up a new community and rents out land to producers and consumers in the national 
economy. Suppose that a city developer charges a fee that is proportional (at the rate a) to 
the disposable income of a city resident. The disposable income after paying this fee is 
 where I(N) is given by (2.26). Assume that the city developer’s marginal   35 
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cost of attracting an additional resident is d. The developer’s profit function is 
. The first order condition is  0 ) (
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aN . Since the 
development market is contestable, in equilibrium all city developers can only earn zero 
profit. Setting   we get   or 
) (N I
d
a = . Plugging this into the first 
















. If the size of a city is smaller than the efficient size, the city developer can 
always earn a temporary profit by attracting more renters and the city grows. If the city is 
larger than efficient, then it is unstable since new cities of more efficient size could 
attract renters, leading to a decrease in the population of this city and an increase in the 
number of cities. An individual developer takes n (the number of cities) as given when he 
sets his city’s size, since he cannot control the number of cities in the economy. Although 
in the model we presented a=d=0 was assumed, all of the qualitative results would be  
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